I. INTRODUCTION
In response to concerns regarding the "dumping" of uninsured and indigent patients by hospitals, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"} 1 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA") of 1985 2 • 3 Several studies conducted prior to the enactment ofEMT ALA estimated that emergency facilities dumped at least 250,000 patients each yeal and that eighty-seven percent of hospitals transferred patients for solely economic reasons. 5 Congress's primary purpose behind the enactment ofEMTALA was to prevent hospitals from refusing to treat indigent patients in emergency situations because of their inability to pay. In addition, EMT ALA was designed to curtail the transfer of indigent and uninsured patients by private hospitals to non-profit hospitals before life-threatening conditions had been stabilized. 6 Ultimately, the goal ofEMTALA was to ensure that every person had adequate access to emergency health care, especially the 'uninsured and indigent. 7 To further this goal of ready access to health care, many states have enacted medical malpractice statutes over the past few decades as part of a general 1 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor ACt (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000) . tort reform movement sweeping across the country. 8 These malpractice statutes often include some form of a damage cap, as well as medical review panel requirements, a statute of limitations, and prescribed amounts of malpractice insurance coverage. 9 While tort reform has been effective in many states in the context of medical malpractice, medical liability reform remains a primary focus of state medical associations' and the American Medical Association's ("AMA") advocacy efforts to reduce medical liability premiums at the federal and state levels and ultimately, to improve quality and access to health care. 10 The initial call to state legislatures and Congress for relief from the declared malpractice crisis occurring in many states was prompted by dramatic increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums. 11 These increases were a primary result of the high frequency of claims filed against health care profes-8 See generally AM. TORT REFoRMAss'N, TORT REFoRM REcoRD (2005) , available at http://www.atra.orglfiles.cgi/7990 _Record _12-31-05.pdf(providing a state-by-state summary of tort reforms enacted since 1986). By upholding the original statute of limitations for minors, the court narrowed the window of time in which claims can be filed, thus preventing an additional flood of claims and a consequent adverse effect on medical malpractice insurance premiums. Indiana Supreme Court Upholds Statute of Limitations for Mmors, ISMA REPoRTS (Indiana State Medical Association, · Indianapolis, Indiana), Mar. 6, 2006, at 1. Therefore, the court's decision is consistent with the policies underlying medical malpractice statutes of ensuring a high· quality of and access to health care. In addition, this decision emphasizes that a plaintiff must have a strong showing to overcome the presumption of constitutionality applied to Indiana's medical malpractice statute.
/d. 10 The AMA continues to lobby Congress for malpractice liability reforms, such as a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical liability cases. AMA Medical Liability Reform, http://www.ama-assn.orglamalpub/category/786l.html. 11 In 2002, physicians' malpractice insurance rates across the country increased approximately twenty percent on average. Richard E. Anderson sionals and the potentially unlimited, excessive verdicts being awarded to plaintiffs in malpractice suits. 12 To date, the AMA has recognized twenty-one states that are currently in a state of medical malpractice liability crisis, an increase from twelve in 2002. 13 Because of the drastic premium rate increases, some physicians havebeen rendered virtually uninsurable at any price and have been forced to resort to state-run plans, 14 which are even more expensive than coverage in the insurance market, in order to continue practicing medicine. 15 Since the enactment ofEMT ALA and the emergence of medical malpractice reform as a primary issue on legislative agendas, courts have struggled to draw a clear distinction between EMT ALA liability and traditional medical malpractice liability. 16 Part II of this Note will focus on the general background ofEMTALA and state medical malpractice statutes, outline the main provisions of EMT ALA, and discuss the structure and mechanics of typical state medical malpractice statutes, specifically, the damage cap provisions. Part III will examine the arguments for and against the application of state medical malpractice damage caps to EMT ALA claims. In doing so, this section will look at several court decisions in various jurisdictions that have analyzed the language and application ofEMTALA's damages provision. Specifically, courts have focused on the issue of whether EMT ALA incorporates state medical malpractice caps on damages, thus subjecting EMTALA claim recoveries to those limits. Part IV will discuss and analyze the key policy reasons for incorporating state damage caps into EMT ALA. Part V will conclude with a brief summary of the reasons for applying damage caps to EMT ALA while focusing on the underlying objectives of both EMT ALA and state medical malpractice statutes.
Cir. 1992) ("EMTALA is no substitute for state law medical malpractice actions."). Under common law, a physician does not owe a duty to provide medical treatment. 23 In addition, hospitals do not owe a duty of care directly to patients because a hospital is not considered to be practicing medicine.2 4 Without EMT ALA, hospitals would be able to refuse treatment to anyone, even those patients w.ith life-:-threatening conditions. 25 Thus, assuming that most health care providers would not voluntarily treat patients if they knew in advance they would not be compensated, the enactment of EMT ALA was necessary to ensure adequate access to emergency health care. 26 Although EMT ALA was enacted in response to concerns that hospitals were dumping patients because of their inability to pay, it applies to all patients who seek emergency treatment, regardless of their ability to pay or insurance status, and is not explicitly limited to indigent patients. 27 An EMT ALA screening obligation is triggered in one of two ways: 1) when an individual presents at a hospital emergency department and requests examination or treatment for a medical condition, 34 or 2) when the individual presents somewhere else on hospital property (but not recognized as part of the emergency department) and requests examination or treatment for an emergency medical condition. 35 A hospital would also incur an EMTALA screening obligation if the individual was unable to make a verbal request but displayed symptoms that indicated a clear possibility of an emergency medical condition. 36 Under such a screening obligation, it is not required that an emergency medical condition actually be found to exist upon subsequent examination. Rather, in the absence of an actual screening request, a request is deemed to exist if a prudent layperson observer would believe, based on the individual's 28 § 1395dd(a); Chiles, supra note 3, at 559. 29 § 1395dd(b X 1 ); see Chiles, supra note 3, at 566-67. 30 Hospitals that fail to provide an appropriate medical screening or to stabilize an emergency condition are subject to heavy civil penalties under EMT ALA. 39 EMT ALA creates a private cause of action for damages against such hospitals when an individual suffers harm as a direct result of a hospital's EMTALA violation. This provision, at issue in this Note, states:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appro-. priate. 40 A large portion of the courts' EMT ALA decisions have focused on the interpretation and application of this provision.
The disagreement among courts concerning the applicability of state damage caps to EMT ALA claims is primarily a result of the ambiguity of the aforementioned damages provision, and in particular, the language permitting an individual to "obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State .... " When an EMTALA claim seems to implicate medical malpractice issues, the confusion surrounding the applicability of state medical malpractice damage caps under the EMT ALA damages provision becomes a primary concern for physicians, potential plaintiffs, attorneys, and courts. Specifically, courts must determine whether ''personal injury'' damages include those available for medical malpractice claims. Courts faced with this should consider multiple factors including, but not limited to, the following: the congressional purpose, legislative history, and relevant policies underlying both EMT ALA and medical malpractice statutes and the potential implications the court's decision will have for professional liability and the general cost of and access to health care.
B. The Medical Liability Crisis and Tort Reform: A General Framework of State Medical Malpractice Statutes and the Effects of Damage Caps
At the local level, states have statutorily imposed medical malpractice damage caps as an element of general tort and medical liability reform in re- 37 Id 38 Id § § 489.24(aXii), (dX2). (2000); Chiles, supra note 3, at 559, 567.
§ 1395dd( dX2)(A).
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APPLYING STATE DAMAGE CAPS TO FEDERAL EMT ALA CLAIMS 93 sponse to the medical malpractice crisis occurring across many states as a result of''the nation's out-of-control legal system ... .'.4 1 The current system is forcing physicians to retire early, relocate, or refrain from performing high-risk medical procedures. 42 Everyday, there are more than 120,000 malpractice actions pending against physicians in the United States, and one-sixth of American physicians report a claim against them each year. 43 These numbers are even higher for high-risk specialties. 44 The amount of malpractice verdicts in states with uncapped medical liability is even more astounding. 45 For example, Texas reported a $606 million verdict in 2005, 46 Pennsylvania had multiple verdicts of more than fifty million dollars each, and together, New York and Pennsylvania paid nearly one billion dollars in malpractice indemnity in 2000. 47 In order to pay such unlimited judgments, insurers must charge unlimited premiums. 48 Some states have declared themselves to be amidst a medical liability crisis as a result of the staggering increase in the cost of malpractice insurance and the consequent decrease in access to critical medical services. 49 Soaring medical malpractice insurance rates and the increased exposure to liability in the United States has resulted, at least in part, from the escalating costs of defending malpractice claims, which are inevitably linked to the increase in both the volume of such litigation and the size of plaintiffs' awards. 5° and since has seen a premium rate decrease of forty percent. Anderson, Defending the Practice, supra note 11. The four major components of MICRA include: I) a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages; 2) defendants may introduce into evidence additional sources of compensation for injury that have already been paid (collateral source reform); 3) periodic payments of damage awards; and 4) limits on contingency fees using a sliding scale. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform, supra note 11, at 350. Indiana also passed comprehensive reforms around the same time as California and now enjoys some of the lowest malpractice insurance rates in the country. Anderson, Defending the Practice, supra note 11. In contrast, Oregon has seen dramatic rate increases since its supreme court invalidated a twelve-year-old $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in 1999. Id Clearly, such damage caps would apply to claims of malpractice, or medical negligence, but since the enactment ofEMT ALA, plaintiffs have often filed what are essentially medical malpractice-based suits under the guise of an EMT ALA claim, possibly in order to circumvent the application of state damage caps, thus affording them an opportunity to obtain a larger award. As a result, courts have faced the challenge of interpreting EMT ALA's language to determine whether damages for personal injury include those available for medical malpractice claims, and thus whether state damage caps apply to EMTALA claims. Ultimately, courts must consider, when determining the applicability of state damage caps to EMT ALA claims, whether they want to open the door for potential plaintiffs to circumvent state damage caps by framing a malpractice-based claim as a federal EMTALA claim.
TIL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST APPLYING STATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS TO EMTALA
A. The Minority View: Unlimited Damages Through Failing to Apply State Damage Caps to EMT ALA Claims
While the majority of courts have interpreted EMTALA to incorporate state damage caps, a few courts have declined to apply medical malpractice damage caps to EMTALA claims. 5 9 Typically, when determining whether a particular state damage cap applies to an EMT ALA claim, federal courts look at the underlying conduct being challenged and the legal theory on which it is being challenged in order to ascertain whether, if brought under state law, it would constitute a cause of action subject to the cap. 60 While the district court's decision in Power was ultimately reversed by the Fourth Circuit, 61 its reasoning highlights the primary arguments against applying a state damage cap to an EMTALA claim. It is helpful to distinguish the analyses of the district court and the Fourth Circuit, in addition to other courts, in order to better understand the varying statutory constructions ofEMTALA that have been used by courts to determine whether to incorporate state medical malpractice damage caps. In Power I, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court alleging that the transferring hospital failed to appropriately screen her for an emergency condition. stabilize her medical condition, and provide her medical records to the receiving hospital in the transfer as required under EMT ALA. 62 She was awarded five million dollars in damages, despite the one million dollar statutory cap Virginia placed on medical malpractice claims. 63 In its analysis, the district court interpreted the language "damages available" in § 1395dd( d) (2) and not malpractice damages. 67 By inference, however, personal injury could include negligence, including malpractice, damages. 68 Nonetheless, the district court went on to distinguish the term "personal injury," as used in § l395dd(d)(2)(A), from the term "malpractice," and then pointed out that there is a "conspicuous absence from the EMT ALA 'patient dumping' provision of any limiting language.'.6 9 The district court relied on these points to bolster its conclusion that § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) limited Ms. Power's damages to only the elements allowed under Virginia law for personal injury, 70 and that if Congress had intended to incorporate malpractice damage caps into EMT ALA, it "would surely have chosen more precise language.'m
The court further reasoned that EMT ALA was neither a tort nor a negligence action; rather, it was a ''sui generis federal statutory action." 72 In addition, applying a state damage cap would conflict with Congress's objectives behind EMTALA, which were to deter patient dumping and to compensate those who were illegally dumped. 
California: Jackson v. East Bay Hospital
Considering the purpose and intent ofEMT ALA and the relevant legislative history, the court in Jackson v . East Bay Hospitaf 5 also refused to apply 75 Cooper v. Gulf Breeze Hosp. Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (involving a patient who went to the emergency room after suffering a stroke, was discharged with instructions to see his heart doctor, and later suffered from paralysis and speech problems; patient filed an EMT ALA suit against the hospital for discharging him without first stabilizing his condition). 76 Florida's medical malpractice statute provided that either a potential plaintiff or defendant may offer to arbitrate the amount of damages in a malpractice action rather than have the issue go to trial. Jd. at 1542 (citing FLA. STAT 86 In its reasoning, the court stated that "EMT ALA clearly incorporates state law in the determination of damages," but the extent or scope of that incorporation is the ultimate issue. P>r The court concluded that because its medical malpractice statute, MICRA, 88 does not extend to all tort claims but rather only to those actions "based on professional negligence," the damage cap did not apply to an EMTALA cause of action. 89 Without a showing of negligence, the court refused to apply the damage cap to the EMT ALA claim. 90 Although this case law offers seemingly persuasive reasons to exclude damage caps from EMT ALA claims, the majority of courts have held otherwise based on more compelling reasons that focus on the plain language ofEMT ALA, legislative purpose, and policy.
B. The Majority View: Limiting Damages By Applying State Damage
Caps to EMT ALA Claims
The Sixth Circuit: Smith v. Botsford General Hospital
Recently, in an issue of first impression, the United States Court of Ap· peals for the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of courts 91 and held that Michigan's cap on malpractice damages applies to federal EMTALA claims, thus limiting the amount of damages a plaintiff can recover for his or her EMT ALA claim. 92 In Smith v. Botsford General Hospital, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital violated EMTALA when it failed to stabilize the deceased's condition before transporting him. 93 On appeal, the hospital contended that the non-economic damages awarded by the jury ($5 million) following trial in the 100 INDIANA HEAL Til LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:85 district court should be reduced according to the state's malpractice cap, which limits non-economic damages '"in an action for damages alleging medical malpractice' to $359,000." 94 In reaching its decision, the court examined the plain language of EMT ALA's damages provision, which reads that "[a]ny individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of [the Act] may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located. " 95 Based on this language, the court reasoned that "damages available" could be interpreted broadly to mean the amount of damages for which recovery is permitted under state law because nothing in the language indicates otherwise. 96 The plaintiff argued, however, that the statute required courts to consider only the types of damages recoverable under state law, and not the amount 97 The court rejected this assertion stating, "[W]e see nothing in the language of the section indicating that 'damages available' does not also mean the amount of damages for which recovery is permitted under state law. " 98 The court went on to analyze the application of the state damage cap to the EMTALA claim, using the framework set forth in the Fourth Circuit decision, Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass 'n, 99 which provided that the starting point for determining whether a state damage cap applies and what damages are available is the threshold question of whether the plaintiff's EMTALA claim would be deemed a malpractice claim under state law. 100 Thus, if an EMT ALA claim can be deemed a medical malpractice claim under state law, it is governed by that state's medical malpractice statutes, and the damage cap provision will likely apply. 101 If a court finds that the claim would not constitute a medical malpractice claim specifically, the state medical malpractice statute would not govern the EMT ALA claim, and the damage cap would not apply. 102 The test applied by the court to determine ''whether the nature of a claim is ordinary negligence or medical malpractice" consisted of two parts: 1) "'whether [the claim] is being brought against someone who, or an entity that, is capable of malpractice"' 103 and 2) whether the claim "'sounds in medical 94 malpractice. "' 104 The second part of the test turns on the additional questions of"l) whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship; and 2) whether the claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience." 105 If these questions are answered in the affirmative then the action is subject to the procedural and substantive requirements that govern medical malpractice claims. 106 When analyzing the issue of medical judgment, the court stated that the distinguishing feature of claims involving medical judgment is the need for expert testimony. 107 Applying this standard, the court determined that the EMTALA failure-to-stabilize claim at issue in the case constituted a malpractice claim because compliance with the stabilization requirements of EMT ALA entails medical judgment understood only through expert testimony. 108 Therefore, the damages in the case were limited by the state cap. 109
The Fourth Circuit: Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass 'n II
Reversing the district court's decision 110 in Power I, the Fourth Circuit also held that the plaintiff's EMT ALA claim was a ''malpractice claim" subject to Virginia's medical malpractice damage cap. 111 In its analysis, the court noted that "EMT ALA is not a substitute for state law malpractice actions, and was not intended to guarantee proper diagnosis or to provide a federal remedy for misdiagnosis or medical negligence." 112 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that the state procedural limitation requiring a medical review panel to examine a claim before going to trial does not apply to EMTALA claims but the substantive damage cap limitation does apply).
107 Smith, 419 F .3d at 5 18 (citing Bryant, 684 N .W.2d at 872) ("If the reasonableness of the health care professionals' action can be evaluated by lay jurors, on the basis of their common knowledge and experience, it is ordinary negligence. It on the other hand, the reasonableness of the action can only be evaluated by a jury only after having been presented the standards of care pertaining to the medical issue before the jury explained by experts, a medical malpractice claim is involved."). 108 Id. Under EMTALA, the health care provider must stabilize to the extent that it is assured, ''within reasonable medical probability, that By including the EMT ALA damages provision, 113 the court stated that Congress explicitly directed federal courts to look to state law in the state where the hospital is located to determine both the type and amount of damages available in EMTALA actions. 114 Therefore, to determine whether the state malpractice cap applied, the court focused on the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff's EMTALA claim would be deemed a malpractice claim under Virginia's medical malpractice statute. 115 Clarifying this issue, the court stated that its initial inquiry was whether Virginia's malpractice cap would apply to a personal injury claim against a hospital that alleges a disparate provision of health care services, but does not allege a breach of the prevailing standard of care. 116 The court in Power II first relied on three Virginia Supreme Court cases in its statutory construction and general reasoning. 117 This precedent demonstrated, according to the circuit court, the Virginia Supreme Court's desire to broadly construe the statutory language enacted by the Virginia General Assembly in defining a cause of action for malpractice. 118 First, in Glisson v. Loxley, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the patient's battery claim was subject to the requirements ofVirginia's medical malpractice statute because battery is a tort. 119 The statute defined malpractice as "any tort based on health care." 120 Therefore, although the battery claim was covered by the malpractice statute, the patient's breach of contract claim was nott2t .
Second, in Gonzalez v. Fairfax Hospital System, Inc., the court held that a suit against a hospital for negligence 122 constituted a malpractice claim under Virginia's statute because the alleged negligent acts occurred while the patient was receiving treatment or "health care" as a patient at the hospital. 123 In addition, "the alleged tort was based on 'health care or professional services rendered ... to a patient,' which constitutes 'malpractice'," and the hospital was a health care provider. 124 Thus, applying a broad, plain meaning approach to the statute, the court found that the malpractice statute's requirement that a defendant receive notice of a claim applied to the plaintiffs EMT ALA claim. 125 Finally, in Hagan v. Antonio, the court held that an allegation of improper sexual conduct by a physician during his physical examination of a patient was an action for "malpractice" requiring the statutory notice provided in Virginia's medical malpractice statute. 126 According to the court, the defendant physician's conduct constituted malpractice because "legitimate or improper, [it] was 'based on' an 'act' by a health care provider to 'a patient during the patient's medical . . . care. "' 127 Thus, the defendant's alleged tortious conduct was "based on health care or professional services rendered," within the meaning of the state's malpractice statute because it "stemmed from, arose from, and was 'based on' the performance of a physical examination." 128 This interpretation of the type of conduct required to constitute malpractice under the statute also suggests and further supports a broad reading of this particular malpractice statute.
Applying the same broad interpretation to the plaintiff's EMTALA claim, the court in Power II concluded that it would be deemed a malpractice claim under the state's medical malpractice statute. 129 The court reasoned that the conduct that formed the basis of the plaintiff's EMT ALA claim occurred while the plaintiff was receiving ''health care" from a health care provider, as defined by the statute. 13° Furthermore, the court found that the tort alleged in the plaintiff's EMT ALA claim was "based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered ... to a ratient," 131 thus falling within the state's statutory definition of malpractice. 13 The Fourth Circuit further emphasized that EMTALA was not intended only to incorporate damage caps for personal injury claims. Rather, courts should determine whether the underlying conduct and the legal basis for the claim would be encompassed within the state's personal injury damage cap, the medical malpractice damage cap, both, or neither, if brought under state law. 133 The problem with this interpretation, as the Fourth Circuit noted, is that the damages available under EMTALA will vary from state to state according to the type and amount of the state's damage caps. 134 The court reasoned, however, that this result is unavoidable because it is inherent in § 135 Furthermore, while the Fourth Circuit agreed that the language in § 1395dd( d)(2)(A) applies to elements of damages, nothing in the language of the section indicated that "damages available" did not also mean the amount of damages for which recovery is permitted under state law. 136 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court in its assertion that Congress was required to explicitly refer to or limit malpractice damage caps in order for § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) to incorporate state malpractice damage caps. 137 Rather, § 1395dd(dX2)(A) reflected Congress's deliberate choice to use the more general and inclusive phrase "personal injury" so that it would not have to explicitly refer to "each and every type oflimitation on damages, e.g. limitations on punitive damages, noneconomic losses, and malpractice damage caps, that the states might have enacted." 138 Thus, Congress was not required to refer specifically to malpractice damage caps or to use other explicit limiting language in order to incorporate such limits. 139 The Fourth Circuit also pointed to the legislative history to support this interpretation.140 When the bill was initially proposed, there were no limitations on the damages provision. 141 There were concerns, however, regarding "the potential impact of these enforcement provisions on the current medical malpractice crisis" and that smaller hospitals would have to close their emergency rooms if the EMTALA penalties were too severe. 142 Thus, in subsequent modifications of the bill, on the issue of damages, the courts were directed to "apply the law of the State in which the violating hospital is located, for actions brought by a harmed individual .... " 143 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress "'was clearly aware of a growing concern in some states that excessive damage awards were fueling a medical malpractice "crisis" ... "' 144 and therefore had wanted to preserve state-enacted ceilings on the amount of dam- ages that could be recovered under EMTALA through the incorporation clause of § 1395dd( d)(2)(A). 145
In addition, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court's views on the goals ofEMT ALA and the Virginia malpractice statute. EMT ALA's preemption provision states: "The provisions of this section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section." 146 The district court implicitly concluded that the state damage cap was preempted under § 1395dd(f) by finding that EMT ALA's objectives of compensation and deterrence conflicted with the Virginia statute's goal of promoting insurance availability and affordability.147 However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with this conclusion and reasoned that EMTALA·and the state damage cap are not necessarily mutually exclusive simply because the overall purpose ofEMT ALA differs from the limited purpose of the malpractice damage cap. 148
When enacting any legislation, including EMT ALA, Congress must balance a number of conflicting concerns. 149 As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law. 150 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that EMTALA's damages provision 151 was Congress's attempt to balance the deterrence and compensatory goals of EMT ALA with deference to the ability of states to determine what damages are appropriate in order to avoid sacrificing either value completely. 152
In addition, according to the Fourth Circuit, ''the appropriate inquiry for purposes of determining whether EMTALA preempted Virginia's statute under 145 [Vol. 4:85 § 1395dd(f) would be whether the actual cap of one million dollars 'directly conflicts' with the goals ofEMTALA."lSJ The court found that there was no direct conflict. 154 Finally, even if there was a direct conflict, the court concluded that a preemption analysis was not necessary because the federal statute, EMT ALA in this case, expressly incorporates state law in its damages provision.155
In conclusion, the court deemed Ms. Power's EMT ALA claim a malpractice claim under the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act for the purpose of applying the damage cap, despite the fact that it did not allege a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care generally associated with a malpractice claim. 156 Because the EMT ALA claim fell within the coverage of the malpractice cap, the court limited the plaintiff's recoverable damages to one million dollars. 157 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit's decision to reverse the district court and find that state damage caps applied to the EMT ALA claim avoided multi-
156 Power II, supra note 60, at 861. The plaintiff did not claim negligence or more specifically, a breach of duty on the part of the hospital; rather, she alleged the hospital violated several EMTALA requirements. Power I, supra note 59, at 1387 n.6; see supra note 62 and accompanying text. EMT ALA requirements providing for civil enforcement by an individual are imposed under a strict liability standard, not negligence. Power I, supra note 59, at 1387 n.6 (citingAbercrombiev. OsteopathicHosp. FoundersAss'n, 950F.2d676, 681 (lOth Cir. 1991)). In order for the plaintiff to prove that the hospital did not provide her with an appropriate medical screening, she must show that the screening was not as thorough or careful as that which the hospital would have provided to any other patient. /d. This may be established through proof of a failure to adhere to the hospital's standard protocols, or, where no such standard protocols exist, proof of a failure to meet the standard of care to which the hospital adheres. /d. In this second instance, the district court in Power I recognized that the line between malpractice and an EMTALA violation "blurs somewhat." /d. Thus, it is possible for a violation to constitute both an EMTALA violation and medical malpractice (where one requirement under a standard for an appropriate medical screening is not met), or only medical malpractice {in an instance where all requirements under a certain standard are satisfied but the incorrect conclusion is made 163 Power I, supra note 59, at 1387 n.6 (allowing the plaintiff to bring a seemingly traditional malpractice action under EMTALA because plaintiff emphasized that she was not only misdiagnosed but was also inappropriately transferred to a different hospital). 164 Such reasons include the following: to prevent forum shopping and the expansion of avenues through which plaintiffs may bring medical malpractice suits and to protect health care providers from being exposed to even greater liability by being liable under both state and federal law for medical malpractice. [Vol. 4:85 laws as well as the legislative purpose and goals for enacting EMT ALA in the first place.
It would be much too simplistic to conclude that because EMT ALA is not considered a federal medical malpractice statute, damage caps applicable to state medical malpractice claims should not apply to claims brought under EMT ALA. This would be inconsistent with not only the policy behind Congress's enactment ofEMTALA, but also the policy considerations that have supported medical malpractice reform efforts in many states and the language ofEMTALA that explicitly directs courts to look to state law in order to determine what damages are available. 165 The negative policy implications of failing to incorporate damage caps on EMT ALA claims are significant and would heavily impact health care providers and health care consumers alike by affecting the affordability, accessibility, and quality of health care in the United States. Furthermore, it would be a large step backward in the nationwide effort to improve state medical malpractice environments for health care providers.
A. Incorporating Damage Caps Will Prevent Plaintiffs from Circumventing State Damage Caps by Bringing Their State Malpractice Claims in Federal Court Under EMTALA
Damage caps should be applied to EMTALA claims in order to prevent plaintiffs from manipulating their claims into patient dumping actions merely to circumvent the recovery caps under traditional state medical malpractice statutes.166 Applying damage caps to EMT ALA claims that are actually based on malpractice-like conduct limits the plaintiff's potential monetary award, regardless of whether he or she files suit in federal court under the guise ofEMT ALA or in state court under the medical malpractice statute. This removes some of the incentive plaintiffs would have to manipulate a traditional malpractice claim into an EMTALA action simply to avoid the state damage caps, with the hope of recovering more than the cap allows. 167 Moreover, framing a suit under EMTALA will all()w a plaintiff to recover under strict liability, 168 relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving negligence, as is typically required with traditional malpractice suits. 169 Lowering the burden of proof provides plaintiffs another incentive to file in federal court under EMT ALA and likely renders it easier for plaintiffs to obtain a verdict in 165 See42 U.S.C. § l395dd(dX2)(A) (2000) exacerbated if plaintiffs were given the option of pursuing an EMT ALA claim without the damage cap limits. It is likely that plaintiffs will be more inclined to file such claims where there is a limitless potential for recoverable damages. Thus, even if the plaintiff does not prevail, the excessive litigation will still impose considerable costs on physicians who must defend such suits. 189 This defense cost must then be calculated into the cost of insurance. 190 Finally, if damage caps are not applied to EMTALA actions, physicians facing malpractice suits will potentially see higher payouts to plaintiffs under EMT ALA, in comparison to state medical malpractice statutes that provide a damage cap. Also, more plaintiffs will ftame their complaints under EMT ALA because of the possibility of higher payouts, or, in the alternative, if they are simply unhappy with the recovery limits placed on malpractice claims by state law. 191 Consequently, failing to apply damage caps to EMT ALA claims will increase the frequency of claims filed against physicians.
V. CONCLUSION Because of the ambiguity in EMT ALA's damages provision, courts have gone in both directions on whether state damage caps shall apply to EMT ALA claims. However, the majority of courts have found that state damage caps are applicable to EMT ALA claims. This has prevented forum shopping and the manipulation of malpractice-based claims into EMTALA claims in many jurisdictions. In addition, this majority position is consistent with the underlying policies and purpose ofEMTALA and state medical malpractice statutes: To ensure adequate access to and quality of health care to all in the United States by limiting the liability physicians face in their practices, which in turn results in lower malpractice insurance premiums for physicians and lower medical costs for consumers.
By controlling the cost of insurance, physicians will not have to pass on as much of the cost of expensive insurance to their patients, making health care more accessible to patients, regardless of their financial status. In addition, the practice of defensive medicine will decrease with the diminished fear ofbeing sued and facing excessive or unlimited jury verdicts. Finally, physicians will be more satisfied with the practice of medicine and will be less likely to relocate or stop practicing, both of which could disrupt the continuity of care. 192 Ultimately, this will result in higher quality health care, preserve access to treat-189 /d. at 1174. 190 Jd In the United States, the average cost of defending one lawsuit is $22,967, id, and if a case goes through a jury trial before a verdict for the defendant, it can cost over $85,000. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform, supra note ll, at 345-46. The total cost of medical malpractice litigation in the United States now exceeds twenty-four billion dollars each year and continues to increase. /d. at 347. 191 Bardot, supra note 67, at 262. ment, and promote a stable insurance market. 193 In contrast, the likely primary effect, although probably unintended, of not applying state damage caps to EMT ALA claims, which could also be framed as malpractice claims, is that potential plaintiffs will be permitted to bypass the state damage cap simply by framing a seemingly malpractice-based claim as an EMT ALA claim. The amount of a possible recovery would be limitless. While this seems to be a broad interpretation ofEMTALA's damages provision, such a reading is necessary to effectuate the plain language of the provision and the policies underlying both EMTALA and state medical malpractice statutes. A narrow reading that does not incorporate state damage caps would have an adverse impact on both the federal and state legislatures' primary objective to promote high quality, accessible, and affordable health care. Thus, the incorporation of state damage caps into EMT ALA is beneficial at the local level for medical liability and general tort reform, as well as at the national federal level.
In addition to the policy arguments, however, it should be considered that many courts base their broad interpretations and incorporation on the plain language of EMT ALA, aside from or in addition to the policy implications. 194 Therefore, if incorporation of state damage caps is in fact determined primarily by the plain language ofEMTALA's damages provision in future decisions, narrowing the scope ofEMT ALA's damages provision or modifYing the application of state malpractice statutes may have to be left to Congress or state legislatures.195
In conclusion, it is imperative that courts keep in mind the probable policy implications and potential adverse effects on access to and quality ofhealth care when interpreting the damages provision ofEMT ALA and its incorporation of state malpractice damage caps. By following the majority approach to incorporate such damage caps, courts can avoid possible adverse effects on health care and simultaneously promote progress in tort reform generally, as well as progress in the context of medical malpractice liability. Ultimately, such an approach will be beneficial to health care consumers and will serve to diminish the crisis occurring in the area of medical malpractice liability by decreasing and controlling malpractice insurance costs, fostering patient access to medical treatment, and promoting a higher quality of health care in America.
